This article analyses the recent struggle for control of the Provisional Irish Republican movement's collective memory of the 1980-81 hunger strikes, during which ten Republicans 
overriding aim was to overthrow British rule through the use of 'armed struggle'. Then, there was no doubt, either inside the movement or out, that the military instrument was paramount (Smith, 1995) . During the 1970s, SF had generally refused to contest elections, with the movement viewing such 'electoralism' with undisguised disdain. For much of this period, many IRA volunteers saw SF as, at best, an auxiliary body which might have some purpose for fund-raising and presenting a public face of the movement; at worst, it was a distraction from the overwhelming priority of building the capacity of the IRA to act as an effective guerrilla army. As President of SF from 1983 until the present day, Gerry Adams has overseen a remarkable process of transition; 'between 1994 and 2004 Sinn Féin moved from the political periphery to the centre-stage... ' (McDowell, 2007: 727) . Internal critics of the strategic direction of the movement would prefer a term like 'incorporation' to describe this process. Indeed, recognising the potential for such a process to generate disorientation and outright opposition in the ranks of the movement, Adams sought to reassure 'volunteers' that the 'struggle' had not been abandoned, but had instead entered a new phase, requiring new thinking and tactics. The end-goal of Irish unity, however, remained sacrosanct, according to this reading of the historical circumstances (Hopkins, 2009) .
At this juncture, therefore, the Republican movement's attitude to its history has become a key site for contemporary political manoeuvring. The movement's culture of memorialisation and its commemorative practices have been placed under the spotlight in a nuanced and complicated fashion. The collective memories of a movement that has for the bulk of its existence been bound up with violent conflict, are clearly marked by both sacrifice, victimhood and suffering, on one hand, but also by questions of legitimacy, responsibility and recognition of hurt on the other. One does not have to subscribe to the view of Conor Cruise O'Brien, namely that within the Republican movement the 'mandate of the dead always outweighs the mandate from the living', to appreciate the 'continuing importance of the dead within Republicanism and the ways in which the dead are linked inexorably to changes within the political landscape and to the political fortunes of Sinn Féin. ' (McDowell, 2007: 730) . Patterson (2011: 81) has argued that the Provisionals have 'attempted to sanctify current strategies by association with the memory of dead volunteers.'
Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent treatment of the memory of the hunger strikes.
It is a commonplace to recognise the key significance of the hunger strikes for the Provisional movement, and their place within the collective memory of the movement has been kept burning brightly over the course of the last thirty years. As has been noted in the different, but related, context of communist cultures of memorialisation, there is a pronounced 'tendency to perceive commemorative practices mainly as opportunities for political mobilization.' (Cossu, 2011: 391) . This occurred in a double sense: first, in terms of mobilising the movement's members and supporters around contemporary political goals (as defined by the leadership); second, in terms of the socialisation of younger cadres, involving the inter-generational transmission of political and cultural understandings. In the case of the Italian Communist Party's approach to commemoration of the wartime Resistance movement, Cossu argued that the conscious construction and dissemination of partisans' biographies (through the party press, for instance), represented a concerted effort to monopolise and control the important symbolic capital that was attached to the Resistance.
This 'extensive use of biography as a peculiar genre of commemoration established continuities within the history of the party: it incorporated the young partisans in a more general and teleological framework of struggle and sacrifice...' (Cossu, 2007: 391) . The Irish Republican movement has attempted to use the biographies of the hunger strikers (particularly the 'officer commanding' and first hunger striker to die, Bobby Sands) in a comparable fashion. The Bobby Sands Trust holds the copyright to Sands' prose and poetry writing, and has regularly published selections from these writings, including his diary, One (Sands, 1983 (Sands, , 1997 .
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3 However, the strategic goals of this political mobilisation of memory are not fixed, but will change according to the prevailing circumstances (as identified by competing groups, both within and outside the party). The significant point here is that the internal culture of the organisation places constraints upon the production of collective memory, and the strategies used to both propagate and challenge aspects of this memory.
The thirtieth anniversary of the 1981 hunger strike was widely commemorated by SF in 2011. SF organised and engaged in a wide range of commemorative practices, from marches and rallies, through to the production of a special supplement to An Phoblacht (SF's newspaper), as well as branded merchandise. 4 The continuing centrality of the hunger strikes to the Republican movement's construction of its past is evident; one or two examples should Adams, while the hunger strikes were crucial as a demonstration of the spirit of endurance and resistance of the Republican movement, and the refusal to accept criminalisation by the UK government, nonetheless, this is only one facet of their legacy. The other critical effect of the strikes was to set the Provisional movement on a path that would eventually lead it to the IRA's 1994 ceasefire, and the compromise of the Good Friday Agreement. Writing in the second volume of his memoirs, he argued that the movement needed to move from a 'culture of resistance to a culture of change.' (Adams, 2003: 28) . Paradoxically, the hunger strike accelerated the process of constructing such change, even while it confirmed the primacy of resistance at that specific juncture. Although the 'most underdeveloped aspects of our struggle were its politics', and 'within Republicanism, armed struggle was the dominating tendency', Adams was clear that the hunger strikes, and more particularly the electoral victories for protesting prisoners, both north and south 7 , that it helped to create, were by no means 'part of any clever Republican plan or strategy.' (Adams, 2003: 11) . However, the argument presented here suggests that the memory of the hunger strikes propagated and validated by the Provisional leadership have most decidedly formed part of a conscious strategy, employed as a crucial element in SF's commemorative practice and contemporary positioning.
Many of those Republicans who are now opponents of the leadership group based around Adams 8 and Martin McGuinness 9 , and of the policy direction pursued by the movement in the last two decades, are fully in agreement with regards to the heroism and sacrifice of the hunger strikers. 10 There is also consensus concerning the fact that they were crucial in shaping the subsequent political evolution of the Provisional movement. What remains the subject of bitter contention is whether the direction of such evolution has involved a renunciation of the movement's historic identity and objectives, or whether its essential character remains intact. As Adams recognised, 'not all Republicans were enamoured by the electoral strategy which emerged out of the hunger strike experience. There were those who felt that taking such a course risked turning SF into just another Irish constitutional party and disempowering the Republican struggle, and particularly the armed struggle.' (Adams, 2003: 15-6) . Commemoration of the hunger strikers could thus be understood as double-edged: 'in lauding past republican martyrs there was an inherent risk that the party's [republican] critics would pose the question of whether their sacrifice could be justified in terms of a result that fell far short of basic republican objectives.' (Patterson, 2011: 82; Bean and Hayes, 2001 ).
Therefore, the contemporary significance of the memorialisation of the hunger strike for the SF leadership is two-fold: first, it wishes to stress the continuity and fidelity of the modern Republican movement with the sacrifice of the hunger strikers, thereby rejecting firmly those ex-members and external observers who accuse the leadership of having reneged on erstwhile political commitments. The 'new phase of the struggle' to unite Ireland does not entail, for the leadership, any profound rupture with the revolutionary past of the movement (Adams 2003: 12) . Second, it is also keen to affirm that a key lesson from the strike is that the movement could only hope to achieve its goals by breaking out of its strategic isolation.
However, this commitment to an equivalent of the inter-war communist parties' espousal of a 'popular front' approach, to the construction of alliances with external forces, was not easily won. In his study of the popular mobilisation in support of the Republican prisoners' 'five demands' 11 , Stuart Ross (2011) makes the important point that in the period 1978-81 the Provisionals were very wary of losing control of the anti-criminalisation movement, which drew in large numbers of non-aligned nationalists and sympathisers (both in Ireland and internationally). The contemporary lesson to be drawn is that the Republican movement could only make progress if it committed itself to 'political outreach' and 'dialogue'.
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Securing support from 20-25% of the electorate in Northern Ireland, and making significant inroads in the Republic are the fruits that SF is reaping from this willingness to engage widely. As Adams put it: 'out of the prison struggle came a revitalised SF, conscious perhaps for the first time of our ability to galvanise public support and to marshal support through elections. The hunger strikes were the beginning of the end of spectatorism in Republican politics.' (Adams, 2003: 49) . This end to 'spectatorism' cut both ways, however. Internal opponents of the subsequent direction travelled by the movement were also galvanised by the prison struggle, and they also view themselves as guardians of this collective memory.
A Provisional 'Official Memory' of the Hunger Strikes?
As Elizabeth Jelin has argued in relation to the production of collective memory, different social actors will produce competing narratives of the past, seeking to establish their contemporary legitimacy and power through a privileged connection to that past. There is likely to be a hierarchy of connection to this past, however, with the lived experience of those who were protagonists in historical events carrying most weight, followed by those who have inherited memories of such experience, those who have studied these events closely, and those who are merely external onlookers. In Jelin's argument, agents of the state have a 'central role and special weight because of their power in relation to establishing and developing an "official history/memory."' (Jelin, 2003: 27) . The 'public management of memory' and the attempt to create an official 'master narrative' for the nation is a crucial facet of state formation. However, a similar effort at shaping the historical narrative may be seen in the memory work of non-state actors. The purpose of such memorialising is to define and reinforce feelings of belonging, with the aim of creating and maintaining social cohesion and defending symbolic borders. In the process, heroes must be mythologised, and their flaws overlooked, in order to present an exemplary or immaculate face to the world. Certain lifestories are held up by political movements as emblematic; they may become 'a personalised form of official party history.' (Morgan, 2005: 56) . For Provisional Republicanism, this process can clearly be seen at work in the elevation of Bobby Sands to mythical status, but it can also be seen (more problematically) in the memoirs of Gerry Adams. Alternative potential role models are likely to have their achievements obscured, and their place in the historical record denigrated.
Once these canonical narratives are established as a form of commemorative practice, they often become crystallised and expressed through repetition. However, this process is a dynamic one, and there are subaltern forces that may seek to challenge aspects of the hegemonic master narrative: '[b] ecause the master national narrative tends to be the story of the victors, there will be others who...will offer alternative narratives and meanings of the past, threatening the national consensus that is being imposed.' (Jelin, 2003: 27 ) For Jelin, whose focus is Latin America, in times of political transition or democratisation from authoritarian rule, there is the possibility that alternative memories (the voices of the marginalised and repressed), that have been too dangerous to articulate beyond the safety of the private world, may be able to emerge into the public sphere: '[p]olitical openings, thaws, liberalisations and transitions, give a boost to activities in the public sphere, so that previously censored narratives and stories can be incorporated and new ones can be generated. Such openings create a setting for new struggles over the meaning of the past...' (Jelin, 2003: 29) What is required to put these alternative counter-narratives into the public sphere? According to Jelin, there is a necessity for 'memory entrepreneurs' 13 , who she defines as enterprising leaders or social agents who mobilise their energies for a cause they strongly believe in. (Jelin, 2003: 33 own 'official' memory remained ongoing. The hunger strike was presented to Republicans as a heroic sacrifice, but one which could ultimately be used to legitimise the future direction of the movement's 'line of march'. In Bean's view, 'like a modern representative state, the movement rests on a shifting combination of coercion and consent. In normal periods, power is largely exercised through forms of consent. For both the British state and the Provisionals, consent is preferred to coercion, which is usually the last resort.' (Bean, 2007: 96) .
The 'discursive constructions of rupture and continuity' within the Provisional movement meant that an effort to commandeer the collective memory of the hunger strike share with many dissidents a belief that the direction pursued by the SF leadership has traduced core principles of their movement, and dishonestly manipulated the rank-and-file in doing so; his allegations concerning the hunger strike are one more dimension of this more general sense of betrayal, but they touch the rawest nerve of all.
In his two volumes of memoir, O'Rawe has defended the incendiary claim that a secretive leadership group, unbeknownst to the IRA's formal leadership (the Army Council), deliberately maintained the hunger strike between July-October 1981 (after the deaths of four prisoners, but before six others died), despite the fact that the leadership of the prisoners believed a deal was within reach with the British authorities. 19 Although his motives have been impugned regularly, O'Rawe is not an easy figure to dismiss; he was not a bit-part player in the drama of the hunger strike, and neither did the charge that he was seeking to profit from sensationalising his memoirs carry any weight. O'Rawe's second book, Afterlives Moreover, the high psychological cost of questioning the mainstream collective memory, and therefore the authority of the leadership, is made plain by O'Rawe. During the maelstrom of the hunger strike era, the overwhelming sense of solidarity of the prisoners, and the intensity of their commitment to each other, and to the cause of fighting against criminalisation, certainly helped to explain the reluctance to pose difficult questions, let alone to break ranks, even privately. During the IRA campaign, many (ex-)Provisionals refused to say or do anything that could give succour to the enemy, through any suggestion of disunity in the Republican ranks. Even after the IRA ceasefire, the very strong bonds of comradeship, and the profound attachment of men like O'Rawe to the Republican 'resistance community', ensured that any embrace of public 'dissidence' from the prevailing 'party memory' was hugely problematic. In Jan-Werner Müller's useful distinction, the hunger strike remained a '"communicative memory", that is, living oral memory based on personal recollection ' (2002: 13) , as opposed to a "cultural memory". 22 This further reinforced the sense that stepping outside the immensely strong bonds of the Republican 'community of remembrance' that had been forged, would entail an irrevocable rupture. As Brendan Hughes put it, 'people stay quiet out of loyalty to the movement.' 23 Although Hughes effectively supported O'Rawe's accusations in his posthumously published testimony, it is instructive that he also found it enormously difficult to revisit this period, partly due to the emotional trauma of remembering, but also 'because I was a good Republican and...as the old cliché goes, "Stay within the army line, stay within the army lines, don't dissent"...I was still of that calibre when I got released from prison. So I didn't question.' (Moloney, 2010: 253) . This self-censorship has been seized upon by the leadership, so any stance other than backing the orthodoxy of this leadership may be presented as disloyalty.
This unwillingness to contemplate 'thinking outside the movement's structures', and thought.' The intensity of emotions that O'Rawe had raised were difficult to appreciate;
'Mackers [McIntyre] went on to say that I had placed a big question mark over the hunger strike, and that that was the "sacred cow", the one issue that hitherto had been untouchable.'
(O'Rawe, 2010: 69). Of course, before the definitive entry into a 'post-conflict' environment, there were also more prosaic reasons for 'saying nothing' and 'keeping the head down':
intimidation, threats and ultimately physical violence were not unknown for those
Republicans who refused to follow the 'party line', particularly if they undermined the reputation of the leadership into the bargain. 24 With the ending of the armed struggle, O'Rawe was finally willing to confront the duplicity that he believed surrounded the hunger strike. However, there was again some ambivalence in O'Rawe's account of his motivation. In 2005, he seemed to attempt to soften the impact of his decision to publish, by insisting he bore 'no grudge against the republican movement, or any individual in it ' (O'Rawe, 2005: no page) . This appeared a product of either naivety or wilful self-deception. He must surely have recognised that his challenge to the established Provisional narrative of the hunger strike, and especially the role of Adams, would be interpreted precisely as a personalised attack, and all of the available evidence suggested that such an attack would not be permitted to pass without serious consequences. If his restated commitment to the movement was designed to forestall the ostracism and character assassination that he suspected was likely to follow, then it was a forlorn hope.
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O'Rawe admitted his doubts about aspects of the prison protest, and his opposition to the 'nuclear option' of the hunger strike. Paradoxically, this opposition was shared at the time by Adams, who resisted the prisoners' demands to embark on a second hunger strike in early 1981 because he felt it 'would divert attention and energy from the tasks of political development; it would also undoubtedly prove an extremely draining experience for Republicans; and it might very well result in a substantial, deeply demoralising defeat.' (Adams, 1996: 285) . O'Rawe (2005: 83) stated that he had worked hard to stem his foreboding and to dispel the doubts that beset him, by placing his faith in the leadership of the movement on the 'outside': 'I felt I had no alternative but to exorcise these negative thoughts, shaping what has become the 'official' narrative, but on occasion, there are hints of a more nuanced account, and, as is so often the case with memoir-writing, the gaps or lacunae in the story are critical (Foster, 2001: 3; Hopkins, 2007) . One example will suffice: in Before the Dawn, Adams (1996: 300) 2 In this article, the term 'Provisional Republican movement' is used to denote Provisional SF and the Provisional IRA, which operated as a unified movement although with the IRA as 'the senior partner', at least in the period from 1970-2005, and the 'standing down' of the IRA. For general histories of the Provisional movement, see Patterson (1997) , English (2003) , and Alonso (2003) . Seven of the hunger strikes who died were members of the IRA, whilst three were from the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).
